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Abstract 
A comparative study of the public distribution systems of foodgrains in India and China 
is expected to reveal lessons and experiences that are valuable to policymakers. This is 
particularly important for developing countries in their endeavour to ensure food 
security. This paper undertakes such an exercise. The main features and developments 
of the two public distribution systems are first highlighted. This is followed by a 
comparative analysis of their similarities and differences. The role of public foodgrain 
distribution systems in ensuring food security is then evaluated. Finally, policy 
implications are drawn. 
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The issue of food security has been around for a long time and the right to adequate food 
and to be free from hunger have been repeatedly affirmed in a number of documents 
adopted by the United Nations (e.g., the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1966, and the 
Rights of Child in 1989). Nevertheless, by the early 1990s, there were still more than 800 
million people, mostly in the developing countries, who did not have enough food to meet 
basic nutritional needs. This led the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to 
assemble a World Food Summit in 1996, in which 194 countries took part and during 
which the Rome Declaration on World Food Security was drawn up.  
The World Food Summit called on the international community to cut the number of 
hungry people by half to about 400 million by 2015. However, the progress towards 
achieving the target, as reviewed in the World Food Summit: Five Years Later in June 
2002, remained disappointingly slow (FAO 2002). According to FAO (2004: 6), in 2000-
02, the number of undernourished people worldwide remained as high as 852 million, 
including 815 million in the developing countries. 
The number of people undernourished in India and China, the world’s two most populous 
countries, currently stands at 363 million (two-thirds are in India), accounting for 43 per 
cent of the world total (FAO 2004: 7). Sources of food insecurity for both countries, i.e., 
huge population, limited agricultural resources, and unstable and unpredictable world 
markets, still prevail, presenting potential threats to national food security. Looking into 
their past practices, especially the access to food by the poor, may reveal valuable 
experiences and lessons. In this paper, we focus on the institution of the public 
distribution systems of food in these two countries and discuss how these systems have 
helped to improve food security.  
2  Inception and evolution of the public distribution systems  
Adequately feeding the huge populations in India and China has been a challenge. At the 
time of independence of the Republic of India and the founding of the People’s Republic 
of China in the late 1940s, both countries encountered severe shortage of food. Since then, 
governments have made considerable efforts to improve food production and great 
achievements have been made. In both countries, the supply and reach of food are more 
comfortable, famines rarely occur, and large foodgrain imports are not required. One of 
the important policy instruments is the use of the public distribution systems (PDSs). In 
this section, we highlight how the PDSs are operated in each of the two countries. Due to 
significant reforms to the PDSs in both countries in the early 1990s, we present the PDSs 
in two stages: the period up to the early 1990s and the period since the early 1990s.  
2.1  The public distribution systems effective until the early 1990s 
India 
In India, foodgrain is distributed through a combination of private markets and the public 
distribution system (PDS). The origins of the PDS can be traced back to the Second 
World War period. Before the war, small deficits in foodgrain supply already existed  
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and were met from imports. When the war broke out, imports became difficult and grain 
prices rose sharply (Suryanarayana 1985: 20). To ensure an equitable distribution of 
food, ration was introduced in 1942, with supplies from domestic procurement and 
imports, and distribution through ration shops. From December 1947 the government 
reverted to decontrol. However, prices had increased steeply by July 1948 and control 
was re-introduced in September 1948. A new scheme of distribution, the fair-price shop 
system, was established to ensure low market prices through large supplies to the 
market. 
In 1965 the Food Corporation of India (FCI) was set up with the goal of handling grain 
procurement, distribution, and building a buffer stock. In the same year, the Agricultural 
Prices Commission (now Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices) was set up to 
advise the government on prices to be paid to farmers. Around 1967/68, the name fair-
price shop scheme was changed to the public distribution system (PDS) but the role and 
organization of the system remained unchanged. 
The PDS is run jointly by central and state governments. While the responsibility of the 
central government (through FCI) is to procure, store and transport grains from purchase 
points to central godowns (warehouses) across the country, the responsibility of state 
governments is to transport these commodities from central godowns  and distribute 
them to consumers through the network of fair-price shops. 
Fair-price shops are owned privately or cooperatively and make profits from the 
commission on sales. They are licensed by state governments and principally distribute 
food items (wheat, rice, sugar, and edible oil) to customers at fixed prices. A shop  
 
Table 1 
Government subsidy on foodgrain consumption in India *  
 Subsidy:     Subsidy: 
Year  Rs million US$ million % of GDP   Year  Rs million US$ million % of GDP
1976/77 4,773  544  0.53    1991/92 28,500 1,013  0.44 
1977/78 4,801  586  0.47    1992/93 28,000 896  0.37 
1978/79 5,694  698  0.52    1993/94 55,370 1,764  0.64 
1979/80 6,000  761  0.50    1994/95 51,000 1,572  0.50 
1980/81 6,500  749  0.45    1995/96 53,770 1,514  0.45 
1981/82 7,000  738  0.42    1996/97 60,660 1,668  0.44 
1982/83 7,110  703  0.38    1997/98 75,000 1,815  0.49 
1983/84 8,350  735  0.38    1998/99 87,000 2,018  0.50 
1994/85 11,010  892  0.45    1999/00 92,000 2,044  0.48 
1985/86 16,500  1,310  0.59    2000/01 120,100 2,543  0.57 
1986/87 20,000  1,545  0.64    2001/02 174,940 3,598  0.77 
1987/88 20,000  1,438  0.56    2002/03 241,760 5,189  0.98 
1988/89 22,000  1,357  0.52    2003/04 251,600 5,557  n.a. 
1989/90 24,760  1,415  0.51    2004/05 277,460 6,372  n.a. 
1990/91 24,500  1,078  0.43           
Note:  *   Financial year, April-March, subsidies on foodgrain include sugar for some years. All are at current 
prices. Exchange rates obtained from www//research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/categories/15, accessed 
on 13 July 2005. 
Source:   GOI (various years).  
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covers about 2000 people. Any person with a designated residential address, rich or 
poor, urban or rural, can draw supplies from these shops. In 2002, there were about 
474,000 shops, 75 per cent in the rural areas. The grains distributed in these shops are of 
fair-to-average quality. Many well-off people prefer to purchase on the open market for 
grains of higher quality albeit at a higher price. 
Pricing is crucial for PDS in India. It is based on current and anticipated open market 
prices. If prices are too high, the PDS cannot not justify its existence; if too low, a heavy 
financial burden ensues. When the price of grain is below its cost (procurement, storage, 
distribution, wastage, etc.), a government subsidy results. Since the early 1970s, 
procurement prices were increased annually to ensure reasonable remuneration to 
farmers. However, the prices at which the PDS dispatched grains could not be raised 
accordingly. Despite periodical revisions of the centrally-set prices, they were generally 
kept below costs. Consequently, the subsidy has increased from Rs 67 million in 
1970/71 to over Rs 10 billion by 1984/85 and Rs 25 billion by 1989/90 at current prices 
(see Table 1). The increase in subsidy has attracted much attention and criticism (Parikh 
1994; George 1996).  
It should be noted that subsidy figures in Table 1 are not deflated. No comparable 
deflators are available for these two countries. Considering that both India and China 
experienced high levels of inflation during the periods covered, the subsidy in real terms 
would be smaller. Nonetheless, we calculated the proportion of the subsidy to total GDP 
and in India in most years it has been typically around 0.5 per cent. The proportion is 
higher in recent years due to a higher level of public stocks. 
China  
When the Communist Party of China came to power in 1949, there was a food shortage 
caused by decades of war. The new government took various measures to promote grain 
production, crack down on hoarding and speculation, and establish as well as strengthen 
state grain organizations. By the end of 1950, the grain situation was basically brought 
under control and the state grain organizations had gained a commanding position in the 
grain market. 
China started its First Five-Year Plan in 1953. With economic reconstruction underway 
on a large scale, the demand for grain outpaced availability. In October 1953, it was 
proposed that the government procure grain directly for supply to consumers in urban 
areas through a ration system. This was endorsed by the government and implemented 
in December 1953. Consequently, the ‘unified grain procurement and sale system’ was 
established, and state grain agencies became the sole buyers and sole sellers in the grain 
market. Three kinds of buyers were covered by this system: (i) the non-agricultural 
population (urban) who were issued with grain coupons, (ii) the agricultural population 
who were engaged in non-grain production or did not produce grain in sufficient 
quantities, and (iii) other grain users (e.g., restaurants, bakeries, and food-processing 
factories or factories using grain as input). 
An important element of the rationing system was that the grain coupons could be used 
in government grain stores, restaurants, and manufactured food stores, etc. Usually they 
could only be used within the issuing area (e.g., a city or a province) but a local grain 
coupon could be exchanged for a more general one (i.e., issued by a higher level 
government) to facilitate travellers. The local grain coupons were usually distributed  
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monthly, but could be used at any time or within a specific period. Although varying 
across provinces/cities, the proportion of fine to coarse grains was often fixed for a 
particular location. Food items sold through government grain shops primarily included 
cereals (chiefly rice and wheat flour), other coarse grains, and edible oil.  
Up till the early 1990s, the system underwent few significant changes. These included:  
i)  Per capita ration was reduced by one kilogram per month in late 1960 in 
response to the nationwide famine; 
ii)  There were three selling price increases in the mid-1960s; and  
iii)  In 1985, the selling price of grain supplied to qualifying agricultural population 
was increased to equal the procurement price (the non-agricultural population 
was still provided with grains at the unified selling price which was below its 
procurement price). In the same year, changes in the provisions for other grain 
users were also made.  
As a result of significant increases in the procurement prices of grains in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, and with no increases in the selling price to the non-agricultural 
population, the government subsidy increased rapidly. By 1990 it had reached 27 billion 
yuan (see Table 2). This soon triggered much attention and debate within the country. 
Some advocated de-control over grain marketing, while others proposed that grain 
prices be determined by the market (see, for example, Liu et al. 1986; Cheng, Lu, and 
Yan 1987; Yu 1987). But many argued that China’s grain situation could not be left 
totally to the market because of the critical importance of grain in feeding the people 
and maintaining social stability (Liu 1986; Ma 1987). The government kept the selling 
price of grain unchanged in order to maintain social stability. 
Table 2 
 Government subsidy on foodgrain consumption in China * 
 Subsidy:     Subsidy: 
Year  ¥ million US$ million  % of GDP   Year  ¥ million US$ million % of GDP
1978 1,114  706  0.31    1991 26,703  5,005  1.24 
1979 5,485  3,666  1.36    1992 22,435  4,059  0.84 
1980 10,280  6,719  2.28    1993 22,475  3,891  0.65 
1981 14,222  8,322  2.92    1994 20,203  2,338  0.43 
1982 15,619  8,232  2.95    1995 22,891  2,735  0.39 
1983 18,213  9,194  3.07    1996 31,139  3,734  0.46 
1984 20,167  8,638  2.81    1997 41,367  4,972  0.56 
1985 19,866  6,747  2.22    1998 56,504  6,807  0.72 
1986 16,937  4,894  1.66    1999 49,229  5,947  0.60 
1987 19,543  5,237  1.63    2000 75,874  9,165  0.85 
1988 20,403  5,468  1.37    2001 60,544  7,315  0.62 
1989 26,252  6,965  1.55    2002 53,524  6,467  0.51 
1990 26,761  5,580  1.44    2003 55,015  6,647  0.47 
Note: *  Calendar year, subsidies on grain, cotton and edible oil. Data excluding cotton not available. All are 
at current prices. Exchange rates obtained from www://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/categories/15,  
accessed on 13 July 2005. 
Source:  SSB (various issues).  
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2.2  The public distribution systems since the early 1990s 
Clearly, both India and China had spent a large amount on subsidizing food consumption 
in the early 1990s. By then, however, majority of consumers in both countries were 
enjoying increased disposable income resulting from economic reforms and could 
afford foodgrains at market prices. To reduce the food subsidy, many argued that the 
PDSs need to be reformed so as to target specifically the poor and needy (Deng 1991; Jha 
1992; Ahluwalia 1993; Pal, Bahl and Mruthyunjaya 1993). Since the early 1990s, both 
governments have reformed the PDSs but have chosen different paths. India has 
endeavoured to make the PDS increasingly targeted to the poor while China has tried to 
reduce the subsidy burden by cancelling the PDS. 
India 
Despite the heavy burden on the public exchequer, few in India have proposed reducing 
or dismantling the PDS in order to reduce the subsidy. Many agree that the PDS should 
be viewed as an instrument of income transfer in favour of the poor. From this 
perspective, existence of the PDS is justified on the ground of providing food security to 
the poor (Ahluwalia 1993; Dantwala 1993; Pal, Bahl and Mruthyunjaya 1993). Such a 
view is shared by the government, which believes that (i) eliminating the food subsidy 
is neither desirable nor feasible in the short and medium term although there is a strong 
reason to contain it, and (ii) the PDS, as it has now evolved and grown, needs to pay 
more attention to the poor and vulnerable (GOI 1994: 66).  
Under such guidelines the government first launched a scheme in early 1992 to revamp 
the PDS in some 1800 backward and remote areas. Additional grains were allotted to 
the states at prices lower than the issue prices for normal PDS. During 1992-95, 
measures were undertaken to reduce the PDS entitlements to the non-poor or less poor 
population in an effort to reduce subsidies. Different types of ration cards (in different 
colours for different rations) were introduced for different groups of the population. In 
1997, the government launched a revised scheme of distribution known as the targeted 
public distribution system (TPDS). Under TPDS, foodgrains were distributed under 
two-tier delivery system to households below poverty line (BPL) and above poverty line 
(APL), with each BPL family receiving a set amount of foodgrains per month at heavily 
subsidized prices (see Table 3).  
Under the TPDS, the amount of heavily subsidized grains supplied to each of the BPL 
families was set at 10 kg per month. This set amount, however, has varied over time 
since 1997, depending on the size of the buffer stock. When the stock level was high, it 
was increased in an attempt to reduce the stock; for example, in 2001 this amount was 
increased to 25 kg per month per family (GOI 2002: 128). It was further increased to 
35 kg in 2002 (GOI 2003: 94). The price at which the grain is sold to BPL families is set 
to equal half of its cost. In practice, however, the issue price to BPL families is often 
less than this stipulated cost (Table 3), and in the earlier years, it was significantly less 
than half its cost. The issue price to APL families was intended to represent 90 per cent 
of the cost but in the past years the actual price was often below this target level.  
The share of grain to BPL families has also changed over the years, and is closely linked 
to the amount available in the buffer stock. In 1997-98, of the 17.5 million tons of total 




Costs and issue prices of wheat and rice in India (1991-2003) 
 Wheat  Rice 












1991-92 3.91  2.80  72    4.97  3.77  76 
1992-93 5.04  2.80  56    5.85  3.77  64 
1993-94 5.32  3.30  62    6.65  4.37  66 
1994-95 5.51  4.02  73    6.95  5.37  77 
1995-96 5.84  4.02  69    7.63  5.37  70 
1996-97 6.63  4.02  61    8.58  5.37  63 
1997-98  7.98         9.37      
BPL     2.50  31       3.50  37 
APL     4.50  56       7.00  75 
1998-99  8.00         9.95      
BPL     2.50  31       3.50  35 
APL     6.50  81       9.05  91 
1999-00  8.87         10.74      
BPL     2.50  28       3.50  33 
APL     6.82  77       9.05  84 
2000-01  8.58         11.80      
BPL     4.15  48       5.65  48 
APL     8.30  97       11.30  96 
2001-02  8.59         11.96      
BPL     4.15  48       5.65  47 
APL     6.10  71       8.30  69 
2002-03  9.15         11.84      
April                   
BPL     4.15  45       5.65  48 
APL     5.10  56       7.30  62 
July                   
BPL     4.15  45       5.65  48 
APL     6.10  67       8.30  70 
Source:   GOI (2004). 
population (GOI 1999: 69). In 2000-01, 18.5 million tons (64 per cent) were allocated 
for distribution to BPL families, compared to 10.3 million tons to APL families. Since 
the TPDS was implemented in 1997, over 60 million BPL families benefit from this 
revised distribution scheme every year.  
In addition to TPDS, the Indian government initiated or strengthened a number of 
schemes to further assist the very poor in the form of cheaper grains. In December 2000, 
the Antyodaya Anna Yojana (grain scheme for the poorest of the poor) was launched 
(GOI 2001: 92). It seeks to identify the ten million poorest households out of the 65 
million BPL families, and to provide them with 25 kg of foodgrains per family per 
month at a low price of Rs2/kg for wheat and Rs3/kg for rice. The Annapurna scheme, 
commenced in 2000-01, provides 10 kg of foodgrains per person per month free to 
indigent senior citizens above the age of 65 but who are not drawing pension under the 
national old age pension scheme. In August 2001, the Sampoorna Gramin Rozgar 
Yojana (integrated rural employment scheme) was announced, under which states are 
provided with five million tons of foodgrains annually for undertaking work  
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programmes. Other existing welfare programmes were also strengthened to provide 
foodgrains to benefit the poor. These include the midday meal scheme, wheat based 
nutrition programme, scheme for supply of foodgrains to scheduled caste/scheduled 
tribe/other backward classes, the scheme for supply of foodgrains to indigent population 
living in welfare institutions (GOI 2002: 128). These schemes are used primarily (i) to 
make the TPDS more focused and targeted towards the poor, (ii) to increase the 
employment opportunities of the poor, and (iii) to help reduce the overstock of 
foodgrains in the central reserves. 
After revamping PDS in the early 1990s, grains are still supplied to consumers at prices 
lower than cost. Hence, the subsidy on foodgrain consumption remains. Since the 
introduction of the TPDS, the subsidy has continued to rise (Table 1) because the issue 
prices for grain for BPL are significantly lower than cost and the distribution of almost 
free grain has expanded through special schemes.  
China 
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the issue of grain subsidy was receiving considerable 
attention (Du 1989; Gu 1990; Ke 1990; Huang 1990; Deng 1991). In May 1991, the 
government moved to reduce subsidies for rationed grain by increasing the unified grain 
selling prices. But they were still below procurement prices. In April 1992, however, 
selling prices were further increased to equal procurement prices. 
Due to a succession of good harvests, market grain prices were low in the early 1990s, 
and were not much different from the prices of grain in government shops. Urban 
consumers bought more grain from the market to ensure better quality and selection. 
Further, the consumption of non-grain food in urban areas started to increase at the 
expense of foodgrain. This resulted in less importance being attached to the grain 
coupon and some urban residents started to sell coupons for cash. After certain 
experiments during late 1992 and early 1993, the state-operated unified grain sale 
system virtually disappeared around mid-1993. 
From October 1993, grain prices in the free market increased sharply and this was 
aggravated by panic buying. Having been sensitive to grain prices, the government 
immediately mobilized measures to cope with the price surge, including price ceilings 
on grain traded in the free market. Although grain prices were brought under control 
early December of that year through heavy administrative interventions, price 
fluctuations continued in some areas in the first half of 1994. From July 1994, grain 
prices rose again quickly all over the country. Certain areas reintroduced the coupons in 
late 1994 and by September 1995, about half of the 30 provinces restored the use of 
coupons (Anon. 1995; Ka 1995). 
Prices were stable during much of 1995, thanks to additional grain imports and 
increased grain supply through government shops at subsidized prices. That year local 
governments were assigned the primary responsibility of handling grain matters under 
their jurisdiction. Consequently, the public distribution of grains differs across regions, 
although all regions procure grains under a quota regime at government-set prices. 
Some cities sell subsidized grains through government shops without ration; others 
apply the ration. A few cities, led by Shanghai and Beijing, also attempted to target the 
low-income population. This was later followed by other cities (Anon. 1996a, 1996b; 
Shen 1999).   
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However, the need for government provision of subsidized grain through its outlets did 
not last long. The grain supply in the market turned to abundance from 1996 and prices 
remained relatively low (Tian and Zhou 2005). For the majority of the population, 
buying grains at the market price was no longer a problem, although assistance was 
continued for some low-income consumers. However, approach to providing assistance 
started to change mainly in the urban areas and a cash income subsidy is currently 
provided to the needy instead of cheap subsidized foodgrain. 
From 1993, reform of the old social security system led to the establishment of a new 
social security system that is cash income transfer based. Since 1994, there has been an 
increased number of publications addressing China’s social security issues (see, for 
example, Ding 1997; Shi 1997; Yan 2003; Yu 2003; Guo 2004). Prior to 1994, attention 
was paid to social security issues by Beijing Review (1994) and Jiao (1994). Jiao (1994) 
points out that as a result of economic reforms, the old social security system could no 
longer ‘live up to its functions of promoting production and social stability, helping the 
underprivileged, and helping to guarantee a basic living standard for all’. It is interesting 
to note is that in recent years, increasing attention has also been paid to the 
establishment of a social security system in rural areas (e.g., Yu 2003; Guo 2004). Wei 
(2003) attempts to address social security issues for rural migrants working in urban 
communities. 
In summary, the PDS in China gradually disappeared around the mid-1990s. Assistance 
to the poor was no longer provided in the form of subsidized foodgrain. Instead, under 
the reformed social security system it was gradually replaced with a cash income 
transfer. Government subsidy on grains, however, was not completely eliminated (see 
Table 2) but is being spent on maintaining stocks to cover any temporary market 
fluctuations and the occurrence of large-scale food insecurity.  
3  Comparison of the PDSs: similarities and differences  
Originally introduced to combat food scarcity, the food distribution systems in both India 
and China have played an important role in ensuring an adequate food intake, particularly 
during periods of food shortage. Both countries supply their people with food at 
subsidized prices under a ration system. In this section of the paper, the two PDSs are 
compared and their similarities and differences are highlighted.  
3.1  The objectives of PDSs 
Both countries have chosen not to rely completely on the private market but to have 
instead a government food distribution system. The main objectives of the system in both 
cases are threefold:  
i)  To contain rises in food prices and keep them within reasonable limits in the 
wake of production shortage and increasing food demand;  
ii)  To ensure availability of minimum amount of food at a reasonable price to those 
who do not produce it (or produce it in insufficient quantity); and 
iii)  To make food available at reasonable prices to low-income groups whose food 
security is most severely affected by high prices.   
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The system has evolved in both countries from a history of periodic food shortages and 
corresponding sharp price hikes in the private market system. The distribution mechanism 
also serves as an early warning and quick response system in case of local famine 
situations. 
3.2 The  system 
The PDS included subsystems for the procurement, storage and distribution of 
foodgrains. Both countries took steps to involve the local/state governments in the 
system. China sought to establish a command position for government organizations in 
the grain market, and thus monopolized grain marketing. The government of India also 
tried the same but failed. Consequently, less than 10 per cent of the grain production in 
India is handled by the government and the rest is left to the private market. The Indian 
PDS does not attempt to meet the public’s entire grain requirement but the PDS is 
instead intended to cover a certain minimum of the eligible groups coming to the fair-
price shops. In contrast, the Chinese government assumed responsibility for feeding the 
entire registered urban population. As a result, quantities handled by the government of 
India are much lower than those handled by the government of China (Figure 1). Figure 
1 also shows that the quantities despatched through the PDS in India have varied, 
depending on grain availability and prices on the open market, while in the case of 
China, with the increasing urban population, the quantity of grains supplied through 
government shops rose continuously until the mid-1980s when additional agricultural 
market reforms were initiated (Figure 1). 
In China grains were procured by the local governments according to quotas as assigned 
by the national government. Total procurements and any imports were allocated to   
 
Figure 1 


































Note: *   Following the price surges in 1993, ration was reintroduced in some regions, and was carried out 
jointly by the central and local governments. The distribution of foodgrain by the various tiers of 
government gradually disappeared from 1993 onward. Data for 1994 and thereafter not available to 
the authors. 
Sources: GOI (2004); SSB (various issues).  
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different provinces by the national government, which also managed the stocks. In India 
the entire procurement process is the responsibility of central government through FCI, 
which constitutes a part of the farmer price support system. FCI, who handle the 
distribution to the states, also manages the stocks and distributions across godowns all 
over the country. Thus, the costs and subsidies involved in the operations of the PDS in 
China seem to have been shared between the national and provincial governments, 
whereas in India they are largely borne by the central government. 
3.3  Operation and performance 
Both countries’ food distribution systems, despite their various shortcomings, have 
played a significant role in distributing food to the people, particularly during shortages 
(Acharya 1983; Zhou 1998; Jharwal 1999; Swaminathan 2000; Zhou, Liu and Perera 
2001). In addition, the public food distribution system has had a significant role in 
stabilizing prices in the market and this is particularly true in the case of India (Jharwal 
1999).  
The unit cost of grain handled through the Indian PDS has been rising in recent years 
(Table 3). This is partly attributable to the high post-procurement cost and leakages to 
the open market (Ahluwalia 1993). In recent years, India’s excessive public stocks 
(Table 4) have added to the increasing cost of its PDS (GOI 2002, 2003). Table 4 shows 
that the actual stock in the beginning of 2002 was more than three times greater than the 
buffer norm. On the other hand, in China low operation efficiency is a key factor 
contributing to the increasing cost of its PDS. Although the government has gradually 
given up supplying grain to consumers through its outlets, it still procures grain for a 
buffer reserve and various other uses. Low efficiency is a significant contributor for the 
increasing subsidy.  
Table 4 
Actual foodgrain stocks (wheat and rice) and minimum buffer norms, India 
Beginning of the year  Buffer norm  Actual stock 
Excess  
(actual stock minus buffer norm) 
1997 15.4  20.0  4.6 
1998 15.4  18.3  2.9 
1999 16.8  24.4  7.6 
2000 16.8  31.4  14.6 
2001 16.8  45.7  28.9 
2002 16.8  58.0  41.2 
2003 16.8  48.2  31.4 
2004 16.8  24.4  7.6 
2005 16.8  21.7  4.9 
Source:   GOI (various issues). 
3.4  The use of private sector  
The private grain sector, if properly regulated and used, can play an important role in 
the management of a country’s food distribution. India and China have treated the 
private sector differently. In China, private traders were subject to strict control and 
restrictions in the early 1950s, and were almost totally banned from trading grains from  
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late 1953 to the early 1980s. Since then, private traders have been allowed to trade in 
the market although they were constrained by many government regulations. In the late 
1990s they were again prohibited from procuring grain directly from the producers 
although they were allowed to engage in other grain trading activities. A new policy was 
introduced in June 2004 which gave more freedom to private traders, allowing them to 
procure grain directly from the producers, subject to a licence. In India, there are fewer 
restrictions on private-sector grain marketing, and as a result, the private grain sector is 
well developed. Private channels have also helped the Indian government to cope with 
the highly concentrated market arrivals during the marketing season in states with a 
heavy surplus. 
3.5  Coverage and targeting 
The coverage of PDS is different in China and India. In China, the ration system 
favoured the registered urban population, irrespective of wealth. Deficit or non-grain 
producing rural households were also included. In India, both urban and rural 
households with designated residential addresses were entitled to subsidized grain, 
irrespective of income. However, during the 1990s, some modifications were introduced 
and entitlements to non-poor families were reduced.   
In India, despite the fact that the rural population is covered and some three-fourths of 
the fair-price shops are located in rural areas, the issue of whether the people in rural 
communities receive an equitable share of the benefits from the PDS has received much 
attention (see, for example, Dev and Suryanarayana 1991; Ahluwalia 1993; Dantwala 
1993). In China, on the other hand, there have been very few arguments supporting the 
interests of the rural people, even when surplus grain was transferred to urban areas, 
leaving rural people without adequate stocks. Contrary to efforts in India, very few 
researchers in China have attempted to examine how the bias of the PDS implemented 
by the Chinese government have impacted on the rural populations of the country. 
3.6  Costs and policy responses  
In both countries a considerable amount of the budget is spent on food subsidies, and 
efforts have been made to reduce the public exchequer’s heavy burden. Each country, 
however, has chosen a different approach to deal with the subsidy burden.  
The Chinese government selected to reduce the subsidy by allowing its PDS to 
disintegrate, preferring instead to reform the old social security system and to establish a 
new system of cash income transfers to focus more on the needy. This transition may have 
been made possible by three factors. First, the majority of the urban population could 
afford to buy foodgrain at market prices. Second, the economy was strong enough to 
provide social security support (in the form of cash income transfers) to the urban poor; 
and finally, the strong grassroots administrative arrangements were useful in helping 
identify the poor.  
Although the government of India realized that there are compelling reasons for containing 
the subsidy, its elimination is considered as neither desirable nor feasible in the short and 
medium term (GOI 1994: 66). Rather than abolish the PDS in order to reduce the subsidy, 
the Indian government initiated policies to improve the efficiency of the PDS, including  
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better targeting of the poor and the vulnerable. This has led to the introduction of the 
TPDS in the late 1990s.  
There have been many attempts to address the effectiveness of the PDS of India, 
especially on its impact on the poor. See for example, Radhakrishna et al. (1997); Kozel 
and Parker (1998); Dutta and Ramaswami (2001); Zhou, Liu and Perera (2001); Dev 
(2002); Ramaswami (2004), and Jha and Srinivasan (2004). Findings are mixed, 
however. According to Kozel and Parker (1998), the TPDS is often cited by the poor as 
essential to their wellbeing. Zhou, Liu and Perera (2001) also indicate that the PDS in 
India has contributed to welfare improvement of the poor. Others, however, believe that 
the PDS has had minimal impact on the poverty and nutritional status of the population, 
and that it is not cost-effective (Radhakrishna et al. 1997; Jha and Srinivasan 2004). 
Some argue that other anti-poverty programmes such as employment schemes could be 
more effective.  
4  Impact of the PDS on food security 
Having compared the PDSs in the two countries, we now address the impacts of the 
PDSs on food security.  
4.1  National food security 
There is no doubt that the PDSs have contributed to national food security in both 
countries. Since consumers are assured of foodgrain supply, the PDS limits 
panic-buying during food shortage, and eliminates unnecessary fluctuations in the 
market. The buffer stock, a vital element of the PDS, plays a particularly important role. 
In China, the PDS helped the country to survive both domestic food shortages as well as 
the western blockage of food imports in the early 1960s (Zhao and Qi 1988). In India, 
the functioning of the minimum support price (MSP) and FCI, and the existence of 
buffer stocks made large-scale food imports such as those under the PL480 food aid 
programme unnecessary. Also, the stock release during consecutive droughts of 2001-
03 helped to ease food shortage. With its buffer stocks, India has managed successfully 
to cope with the severe drop in grain output without having to rely on large imports.1 In 
2003, India managed to net-export about 5 million tons of grains (GOI 2004: s-22). 
4.2  Food security of the general public 
In principle, the PDS in India is accessible to all people, rural or urban residents, rich or 
poor, provided that they have the designated residential address. In contrast, the majority of 
the rural people in China were excluded, but all urban residents, rich or poor, were covered. 
These measures have ensured a more equitable distribution of foodgrain to the general 
public, particularly important in times of severe grain shortages.  
                                                 
1   India’s buffer stock level dropped from 61.7 million tons in July 2001 (when the norm in July is 24.3 
million tons) to 20 million tons in April 2004 (the norm in April being 15.8 million tons) (GOI 2004: 93).  
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The urban bias in China was unfair to its farmers. Nonetheless, the country has been 
able to sustain its population through several difficult times of food scarcity. In 
retrospect, this practice of milking the agricultural sector has enabled China to secure 
grain for urban distribution and to extract funds for industrialization, giving the country 
more momentum for development (Liu 1998).  
4.3  Food security of the poor 
When the PDSs were first initiated, there was no direct targeting the poor in either 
system. The poor were treated as any other eligible person. In China, while the majority 
of rural residents were excluded, the very poor were provided with various relief 
measures. Targeting the poor was gradually introduced in urban areas from the early 
1990s as a means of reducing grain subsidy. The price surges of 1994 and 1995 led to 
supplies being rationed in some regions. During those few years, targeting was widely 
used (Anon. 1996a, 1996b; Shen 1999).  
In India, the PDS was indirectly targeted for the poor, as the provision of grain was only 
fair-to-average in quality, and wealthier customers could buy better quality grain on the 
open market. The system became more protective of the poor with the introduction of the 
TPDS in 1997. While Radhakrishna et al. (1997) claim that the impact of the PDS on 
nutritional status of the poor is minimal, Zhou, Liu and Perera (2001) find that the cereal 
consumption and nutritional intake of the poor has improved over time, thanks to the PDS. 
The Zhou study analyses food consumption and nutrition intake of the poorest 30 per 
cent of the population. It examines how the PDS may have affected the food 
consumption and welfare of the poor from multi-dimensional perspectives: between 
rural and urban regions, across states, and over time. According to Ramaswami (2004), 
targeting was achieved because the relatively rich voluntarily sidestep the programme. 
However, as the poor in India live in slums, they do not have the requisite designated 
address and may consequently not be able to take advantage of the PDS. Indeed, they may 
even be worse off, as PDS has induced higher open market prices (Dantwala 1967; Tyagi 
1990: 88-99).  
5 Policy  implications 
5.1  Subsidy on food can be a cost-effective way to help 
the developing-country poor  
The substantial food subsidy has attracted criticism in both countries, and the efficiency 
of the PDSs is often questioned. However, it must be recognized that the most essential 
part in the wellbeing of the poor is access to adequate food supply and that food needs 
to be obtained within a much stricter time constraint than virtually any other life 
necessity (Spitz 1985). Access to food (in the short term) can be arranged either through 
direct cash transfers within a well-established social security system, or through the 
provision of subsidized food by PDS. Direct transfers imply an effective income 
monitoring mechanism so that an income test can be applied, but most developing 
countries lack such a mechanism. Consequently, a government-administered system for 
distributing food at reasonable prices is a practical option to provide a safety-net to the 
poor.   
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Table 5 
Shares of social security expenditure and foodgrain subsidy  
















expenditure and grain 
subsidy out of total 
govn’t expenditure  
  Rs million  Rs million  Rs million  %  % 
 INDIA,  1992-2004 
1991/92 10,470  28,500  1,061,688 0.99  3.67 
1992/93 12,910  28,000  1,186,173 1.09  3.45 
1993/94 14,440  55,370  1,364,894 1.06  5.11 
1994/95 17,410  51,000  1,502,600 1.16  4.55 
1995/96 26,000  53,770  1,688,889 1.54  4.72 
1996/97 27,830  60,660  1,910,450 1.46  4.63 
1997/98 29,440  75,000  2,154,867 1.37  4.85 
1998/99 33,310  87,000  2,568,860 1.30  4.68 
1999/00 48,340  92,000  2,994,312 1.61  4.69 
2000/01 33,770  120,100  3,256,698 1.04  4.72 
2001/02 37,130  174,940  3,612,364 1.03  5.87 
2002/03 32,060  241,760  4,013,750 0.80  6.82 
















expenditure and grain 
subsidy out of total 
govn’t expenditure  
  ¥ million  ¥ million  ¥ million  %  % 
 CHINA,  1993-2003 
1993 7,527    22,475  464,230 1.62  6.46 
1994 9,514    20,203  579,262 1.64  5.13 
1995 11,546    22,891 682,372  1.69  5.05 
1996 12,803    31,139 793,755  1.61  5.54 
1997 14,214    41,367 923,356  1.54  6.02 
1998 17,126    56,504  1,079,818 1.59  6.82 
1999 17,988    49,229  1,318,767 1.36  5.10 
2000 21,303    75,874  1,588,650 1.34  6.12 
2001 26,668    60,544  1,890,258 1.41  4.61 
2002 37,297    53,524  2,205,315 1.69  4.12 
2003 49,882    55,015  2,464,995 2.02  4.26 
Notes:  (a  Includes expenditure on (i) welfare of SC/ST and other backward classes and (ii) social welfare 
and nutrition.  
  (b  Includes subsidies on grain, cotton and edible oil. Data without cotton are not available 
Sources:  GOI (various issues) for India, and SSB (various issues) for China. 
 
In developing countries like India and China, expenditures on food subsidy are a part of 
the country’s social security expenses. A comparison between social security spending 
in the USA, Australia, and Japan and food subsidy expenditure in China and India 
reveals that the expenditure of developed countries on social security is much higher 
than that of India and China on food subsidies (expressed as share of total government 
budget) (Zhou and Gandhi 2000). Whereas social security expenditure is 22 per cent in 
the USA, 35 per cent in Australia, and 22 per cent in Japan, food subsidy is only about  
15 
4-6 per cent in China and India. In both countries, even when all other social security 
expenditures are included, the proportion at about 6-8 per cent is still much smaller than 
that in the developed countries (Table 5). 
Given that the PDS is still being used in India, the country’s economists and 
policymakers need to evaluate the situation carefully when they embark on reducing the 
food subsidy. Efforts to reduce the subsidy purely for the sake of improving efficiency 
must take into consideration the cost of helping the poor in other ways. The experience 
of China clearly shows that while the foodgrain subsidy has dropped in recent years, 
total social security expenditures have increased in both absolute and relative terms (see 
Table 5, bottom panel). In contrast, even though the foodgrain subsidy has escalated 
recently in India, the social security expenditure has not increased. In balance, total 
expenditures for both social security and food subsidy have remained largely 
comparable to earlier years (see Table 5, top panel). For India, helping the poor through 
the PDS seems to be the appropriate approach.  
5.2  The level of economic development and provision of food subsidy  
With regard to food security, the experience of China shows that when a country’s 
economic development reaches certain level, it is possible to shift from food subsidy to 
direct cash payments. In doing so, one needs to consider the general public’s ability to 
buy grain on the open market, and whether the truly poor can be identified without 
unreasonable high administrative costs. China, with its history of a centrally controlled 
regime, has well organized administrative mechanisms in place that extended right 
down to street-level units. This helps to identify those in need with little extra costs.  
In India today, the majority of the population can afford to buy grain on the open market 
and in normal circumstances they do not need to rely on the PDS. The country’s 
economy is also in a much stronger position than earlier. However, India lacks the 
administrative facilities that could help to identify the poor and to administer income 
transfers in a cost-effective manner. Thus, the PDS is likely to exist in India for some 
time to come.  
5.3  PDS is still needed in India 
In India, a large number of people are undernourished; India’s undernourished may well 
constitute the largest share of hungry people in any single country of the world. They all 
need to be provided with food. Given that identifying the poor and administering direct 
income transfers is likely to be costly, food subsidy with proper targeting remains a more 
cost-effective way to improve food security. Policymakers, economists, and the general 
public should not be hasty in abolishing the PDS but should wait till the country is ready to 
make direct income transfers to the poor.  
Until such a time, it is imperative to improve the efficiency of the PDS to reduce or 
eliminate waste and leakage. In recent years, the demand for the PDS has been declining, 
largely due to income growth on one hand and a change in the structure of demand on the 
other. Indians are consuming less foodgrain per capita by substituting non-cereal foods 
(GOI 2002: 123). This decline may justify gradual reduction in the size of PDS operations.  
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Pilot programmes to reduce PDS operations or even shift to direct income transfers could 
be considered in regions or states where conditions permit.  
5.4  A buffer stock controlled by the central government is essential 
In India, buffer stocks are a significant element in the operations of the PDS, and in 
efforts to smooth domestic market fluctuations. China, on the other hand, was unable to 
build a reasonably sized buffer stock until the mid-1980s (Zhou 1997), but since then 
the buffer stock has contributed importantly to the management of China’s grain 
economy. A buffer stock controlled by the central government is still the vital means of 
achieving food security in both China and India. This is true whether or not a physical 
PDS is maintained. In China, the PDS gradually disappeared, but the buffer stock 
system is still in place. Such a system is needed to deal with temporary market 
fluctuations and to handle any large-scale food insecurity.  
It would be to the advantage of both countries if they could learn from each other. India, 
on the one hand, could gain from China’s experience by learning to manage its buffer 
stock with more flexibility. Once the stock becomes excessive, different measures need 
to be exercised to dispose of the surplus, e.g., exporting, as China did in 1998-2003, 
when it exported large quantities from its buffer stock, even though subsidy had to be 
provided. Excessive grain stock can also be used to produce processed foods or animal 
products.  
China, on the other hand, could benefit from India’s PDS administration by bringing 
transparency to its buffer stock management. Zhou and Tian (2005) attribute the high 
cost of maintaining China’s buffer stock to the lack of transparency. With transparency 
in its operations, China may not need to maintain such high volumes of buffer stock. 
Learning from each other could resolve the criticism often directed at the excessive 
amount of public stock in India or the lack of transparency in grain management in 
China. Interestingly, although China’s buffer stock is well over 100 million tons (exact 
figures not available from government sources), few have complained about excessive 
buffer stock (limited information published on the minimum norm). Quite the contrary, 
the Chinese are often concerned about grain security. In comparison, when India’s 
buffer stock was some 20-40 million tons over its norm in the past few years (15.8 
million tons in April and 24.3 million tons in July), there was considerable outcry about 
the excessive stock. 
6 Concluding  comments   
In this paper, we examined the institution of the PDSs in India and China and discussed 
how the PDSs have helped these two populous countries to improve national food 
security, food security of the general public, and food security of the poor. Our analyses 
show that a PDS is a useful policy instrument, particularly when there is a shortage of 
food. It can also be a cost-effective measure to counteract poverty. Moreover, a buffer 
stock controlled by the central government is essential to ensuring and improving a 
country’s food security, regardless of whether or not a physical PDS is maintained.  
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The experiences of the PDSs in both countries under study could provide valuable 
lessons. India would benefit by adopting a method of flexible management for its buffer 
stock, as is done in China. Likewise, China needs to adopt a lesson from India in 
managing its buffer stock with transparency. Contrasting experiences in the two 
countries reveal that when a country’s income level improves, PDS operations need to 
be modified to make it more flexible and better targeted. For example, the PDS should 
be geared to helping the poor in normal circumstances, and its coverage extended during 
food emergencies. Following China’s example, India might consider reducing its PDS 
operations, the reduction needs to be done gradually. Pilot programmes to reduce PDS 
operation or to switch to direct income transfers could be considered in regions or states 
where conditions permit. 
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